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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Software Acquisition Patterns of Failure and How to 
Recognize Them1 
Lisa Brownsword—Brownsword is a senior member of the Acquisition Support Program at the 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI). She manages and participates in customer engagements for 
major programs within the DoD and federal agencies, providing pragmatic expertise in software 
engineering, systems of systems (SoS), commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)-based systems (CBS), 
architecture and product lines, and iterative development. She is managing a research team to 
identify patterns of misalignment of acquisition strategies, architecture, and program business and 
mission goals that lead to program problems. [llb@sei.cmu.edu]  
Cecilia Albert—Albert is a senior member of the technical staff in the Acquisition Support Program at 
the SEI, where she has managed strategic software improvement across Army programs and co-
developed a process for developing COTS-based systems. Albert has more than 35 years of 
experience developing and acquiring software-reliant systems and holds a master’s degree in 
computer science from Stanford University and a bachelor’s degree from Sweet Briar College.  
[cca@sei.cmu.edu] 
Patrick Place—Place is a senior member of the technical staff in the Acquisition Support Program at 
the SEI. Recent projects include developing practices for engineering in an SoS context; the Service 
Migration and Reuse Technique (SMART); and the acquisition implications of adopting a service-
oriented architecture (SOA) development strategy. He has participated in a number of independent 
technical assessments related to the adoption of SOA practices. Place has been an adjunct lecturer 
at Carnegie Mellon University, South Bank University, and Imperial College, teaching various courses 
on the use of formal specification techniques. [prp@sei.cmu.edu] 
David Carney—Carney is a retired member of the SEI, now working as a consultant on select 
Acquisition Support Program assignments. He has 30 years of experience as a software engineer 
working at Intermetrics Inc., the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the SEI. His fields of particular 
interest have included CASE tool environments, SoS integration, issues relating to the use of COTS 
products, and service-oriented architectures. [djc@sei.cmu.edu] 
Abstract 
In systems today, software provides substantial portions of capability and performance. In 
many Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions, however, software too often is a minor 
consideration when the early and most constraining decisions about program cost, schedule, 
and behavior are made (i.e., prior to Milestone A). These decisions manifest themselves in 
the acquisition strategy, the system and software architecture, and ultimately in the deployed 
                                                
1 Copyright 2013 Carnegie Mellon University 
This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under 
Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software 
Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. 
NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN “AS-IS” BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY 
MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY 
MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR 
MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. 
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system. Based on our experience with large programs, we have identified seven patterns of 
failure that lead to misalignment between the software architecture and the acquisition 
strategy, leading to program restarts, cancellations, or other failures. 
We describe the characteristics of these patterns of failure and relate them to weak or 
missing relationships between key artifacts—relationships that should exist even at an early 
stage of the life cycle. In this paper, we focus on those artifacts that relate to the expression 
and analysis of business goals. We present early results in the development of acquisition 
quality attributes (analogous to software quality attributes) and how these attributes relate to 
acquisition strategies. We conclude with some speculation on what is needed to avoid the 
failure patterns. 
Introduction 
In systems today, software provides substantial portions of capability and 
performance. One consequence for DoD acquisition is that software issues are major factors 
in cost and schedule overruns. However, software is often a minor consideration when the 
early, most constraining program decisions are made. This has negative consequences, 
most often in terms of misalignments between the software architecture2 and system 
acquisition strategies.3  Our analysis of troubled programs shows that these misalignments 
lead to program restarts, cancellations, and failure to meet important mission and business 
goals.4  Our research focuses on enabling organizations to reduce their program failures by 
harmonizing their acquisition strategy with their system and software architectures.  
One major source of misalignments is the diverse sets of stakeholders of complex 
programs; it is inevitable that some (perhaps many) of their diverse goals and priorities are 
in conflict. Operational users, combat commanders, funding authorities, and acquisition 
team members may think they share the same priorities, but when interviewed, their 
answers often vary widely in terms of the goals and features they see as the most important. 
In many cases, the solutions that are then created are based on goals of one set of 
stakeholders—goals that can conflict with those of other stakeholders without explicit 
consideration of the tradeoffs being made. Ultimately, such conflicts in goals eventuate in 
the misalignments described previously. 
Observed Patterns of Failure 
Characteristics of the Patterns We Observed 
The major source of our data for this research was interviews with participants in 
major acquisition programs, most of which encountered some sort of difficulty, ranging from 
partial to total failure. These data are also supported by decades of experience on the part 
of all of the authors in studying, assessing, and participating in actual programs, many of 
which evidenced similar failing behaviors. Virtually all of the conclusions derived from our 
                                                
2 Software architecture is defined by Bass, Clements, and Kazman (2012) as “the structure or 
structures of the system, which comprise software elements, the externally visible properties of those 
elements, and the relationships among them.” 
3 Acquisition strategy (2011) is defined by the Defense Acquisition University as “a business and 
technical management approach designed to achieve program objectives within the resource 
constraints imposed. It is the framework for planning, directing, contracting for, and managing a 
program. It provides a master schedule for research, development, test, production, fielding, 
modification, postproduction management, and other activities essential for program success.” 
4 A mission goal is an expression of an objective that affects a user, focused on what the solution or 
product should do or how it should behave. A business goal is an expression of an organizational 
(e.g., Navy) objective, focused on goals relative to the business model for acquiring or developing the 
solution or product.  
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interviews were strongly supported by our aggregate experiences as active professionals, in 
both government and non-government roles in the domain of DoD acquisition. Analysis of 
these data has led us to observe several recurring patterns. Because of their negative 
consequences, and following common usage throughout the software engineering 
community as exemplified by Brown, Malveau, McCormick, and Mowbray (1998), we 
characterize these as anti-patterns. 
Buschmann, Meunier, Rohnert, Sommerlad, and Stal (1996) provided a form for 
describing patterns, calling out the need to give patterns a name and to define the context 
(environment), the problem, and the solution. We modify this approach for our anti-pattern 
descriptions. First, we include the notion of consequence, as defined by Gamma, Helm, 
Johnson, and Vlissides (1994). Second, in lieu of calling the observed activity “solution,” we 
have titled that activity “observed response” (i.e., to the problem). Thus, each of our anti-
pattern descriptions has the following elements: 
 name (readily identifies some key aspect of the problem) 
 context (situations where the pattern occurs) 
 problem (recurring issues and forces that characterize the problem)  
 observed response (the manner in which people attempt, consciously or 
otherwise, to solve the problem) 
 consequences (results of applying the observed response to the problem in 
the given context) 
Overview of Findings 
In each of the programs studied, we observed several instances of activities and 
behaviors that qualify as anti-patterns. In some cases, the anti-patterns were of sufficient 
magnitude that they had severe negative effects on program success. None of the anti-
patterns were observed in all of the programs we studied, and none were seen in only one 
program. We, therefore, believe that they were sufficiently pervasive that they were true 
patterns of behavior.  
The set of anti-patterns we observed in these programs consists of the following: 
1. Undocumented Business Goals   
2. Unresolved Conflicting Goals 
3. Failure to Adapt   
4. Turbulent Acquisition Environment 
5. Poor Consideration of Software 
6. Inappropriate Acquisition Strategies  
7. Overlooking Quality Attributes 
These anti-patterns, like most factors that negatively affect acquisition programs, 
eventually result in a small number of familiar and unhappy consequences: schedule delays, 
cost overruns, delivery of less than was promised, or outright program cancellation. In that 
sense, the ultimate consequences of these anti-patterns in the programs we studied have 
an expected similarity. 
However, the immediate consequences of different anti-patterns differ in many ways. 
For example, the immediate effects of leaving key business goals unstated is different from 
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those that result from a turbulent acquisition environment. Since, in the methods we hope to 
develop, we intend to focus on some of the immediate and visible symptoms of anti-patterns 
as a way to minimize or eliminate their negative influence, these immediate consequences 
are important. Therefore, in the descriptions that follow, we indicate a number of these 
immediate consequences, although we also mention, wherever possible, the longer term 
consequences that we observed. 
Each of these is discussed in the subsections that follow. 
Undocumented Business Goals 
Context. This anti-pattern stems from a lack of precise, well-defined, and well-
documented business goals for a DoD acquisition, goals that would correspond to the 
precise, well-defined mission goals usually created for a program. The DoD’s business goals 
are the major driver for an acquisition strategy, which should make some provision for 
software. But the actual role that the detailed business goals play in the software, 
particularly its architecture, is often minimal. 
Problem. Although business goals obviously influence a program’s acquisition 
strategy, they can also have a strong influence on system and software architecture. This 
additional influence is seldom recognized, even when it is vital that it should be. Examples of 
such influence include the following: 
 “avoid vendor lock” or “maximize competition” has potentially significant 
importance when defining software architecture;  
 a mandate to employ reuse as much as possible may have a strong negative 
impact on the software architecture if the software to be reused is itself poorly 
architected; and  
 the goal of a software “open architecture” may have a significant impact on 
the underlying system architecture.5 
Two factors cause this problem. First, at the high level, many business goals are 
generally expressed only as very broad mandates, and others are not explicitly expressed at 
all. Second, at the detailed level, there is no useful process for capturing and prioritizing 
business goals in a program-specific way that is comparable to the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process that supports definition and 
prioritization of mission goals and their associated requirements. 
This anti-pattern is particularly problematic in programs that are building a system 
that must integrate with other systems (which may themselves be in varying stages of 
development). While the high-level goal of an integrated system may be explicit, the detailed 
goals (together with an understanding of needed resources) for the system of systems 
(SoS) are often left unspecified.  
Observed Response to the Problem. The general response to this anti-pattern is 
that the architect has no other choice, and hence the mission requirements defined by the 
operational side drive the architecture, which then reflects only those mission requirements. 
Yet, were the detailed business goals available, some, perhaps many, of those business 
goals might be critical enough to overshadow some of the mission requirements.  
                                                
5 Using Maier (2006), we characterize typical system architectures as compositional (is-a-part-of 
relationships) and software architectures as more typically layered hierarchies (is-used-by 
relationships).  
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An example can be seen in an instance where there might be an implicit but 
unspecified business goal that favored a highly distributed contractor/subcontractor profile. 
Lacking awareness of that goal (because it is unstated), a software architect might 
reasonably design a monolithic architecture to satisfy a mission goal for performance.  
 Consequences. This anti-pattern was observed in three of the six programs under 
study. In the program in which it was most visible, a new system with significant new 
capabilities was needed; a business goal was to replace several systems that were “end-of-
life.” The acquisition strategy specified a slow, deliberate pace to ensure that the new 
capability was defined correctly. But ignored in this strategy was the urgent need by users to 
replace these failing systems as quickly as possible. When the operators and maintainers of 
the legacy systems became aware of the intended acquisition strategy, they forced a major 
change in focus for the program. The consequence was a significant delay for the program. 
In the other programs where this anti-pattern was observed, the effect was less 
pronounced. Systems were delivered, although with less functionality than was expected. In 
all cases, follow-on programs have been started to create the functionality that was originally 
promised by these programs. 
In sum, the overall effect of this anti-pattern is that important guiding documents—in 
particular, the architecture and acquisition strategy, or both—fail to reflect the joint influence 
of both business and mission goals. Inevitably, the lack of documentation of missing 
business-related goals (and their associated quality attributes for the architecture) will result 
in a system that fails to meet the expectations of at least some of the key stakeholders, 
because the joint expectations of all of the stakeholders have never been adequately 
reasoned about.  
Unresolved Conflicting Goals 
Context. This anti-pattern is often a direct consequence of the previous one, the 
distinction being that the first anti-pattern refers to the absence of well-documented business 
goals, while this one refers to the lack of an analysis and de-confliction of the known goals. 
Problem. The variety and scope of mission and business goals can be very large, 
and for a program of any consequence, there will likely be conflicts among some of these 
diverse goals and priorities. One factor that compounds the problem is that the business 
goals and the mission goals are often developed by people from different communities—
people with very different concerns. 
But to reason about these conflicts requires that all of these goals be considered 
jointly, so that their mutual influence can be understood and misalignments negotiated. 
Reasoning is obviously impossible if, as in the previous anti-pattern, the business goals are 
not well documented. But even if there is a set of well-documented business goals, no 
processes or criteria exist by which tradeoffs between important business and mission goals 
can be made. It is often not even clear who should arbitrate such goal conflicts. 
A frequently observed example of this anti-pattern is reflected in the conflict between 
the goal of introducing a new or updated system and the additional goal of avoiding 
impacting how current end users perform their tasks. At best, this is a conflict of 
expectations that is not fully understood until the system is deployed, potentially presenting 
a barrier to deployment.  
Finally, one specific problem that is often observed, and one that mixes both 
business and mission elements, is that a program shares dependencies with other systems 
in a larger SoS context. Too often, each of these systems is considered in isolation, and the 
mission and business effects that each program should have on the others is ignored. When 
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these effects surface, joint consideration is often carried out too late in program execution to 
be effective or to succeed. 
Observed Response to the Problem. Program personnel tend to separate into 
business (e.g., acquisition strategy) and mission (e.g., system and software architecture) 
communities, each of which tends to work in isolation. Given this separation, these 
personnel tend to produce artifacts that reflect the goals and priorities known to them; these 
in turn may be misaligned in that they reflect unresolved conflicts between business and 
mission goals such as those described previously. 
Consequences. This anti-pattern was observed in five of the six programs under 
study. In one program, various business goals concerning reuse, using multiple contractors, 
reducing integration costs, and such mission goals as greatly increased performance had 
produced numerous unresolved conflicts. When the gravity of the conflicts was belatedly 
understood (by an independent “tiger team”), both the initial acquisition strategy and the 
initial architecture were abandoned, and a major reconsideration of both—in which they 
would be reconciled and aligned—was begun. While this brought about a significant delay, it 
avoided the far worse result of a system that failed both its business and mission 
stakeholders.  
In general, it is likely that in a program of any consequence, conflicts between 
business and mission goals will exist. But if the conflicts are not reconciled before the 
acquisition strategy and the architecture (both system and software) are defined, the 
negative effects that these conflicts will have will be large. Unless joint consideration of 
mission and business goals is carried out early in program execution, conflicts between 
goals will soon become difficult, or even impossible, to reconcile. And, ultimately, 
stakeholders who expected their mission or business goals to be reflected in the acquisition 
strategy and then satisfied by the software architecture are unhappily surprised when the 
system cannot support their mission or business objectives.  
Failure to Adapt 
Context. This anti-pattern often occurs when program duration is very long. The 
reasons for length can be inherent, such as when a system is unprecedented and requires 
considerable time to solve massive engineering problems (for instance, creation of the Joint 
Strike Fighter). Or the reasons for highly extended program duration can be circumstantial, 
such as a protracted, complex protest to a contract award. This anti-pattern can also occur 
when a program evolves from providing limited capabilities to providing a much wider range 
of capabilities. 
Problem. In most programs, both the acquisition strategy and the architecture are 
optimized to meet the goals and priorities that exist at the start of the program. However, 
goals and priorities naturally evolve over time: Examples of such change could include the 
need to combat new and unexpected threats, or a desire to modernize a capability using 
new technology. The essential problem lies in the fact that the architecture and acquisition 
strategy that are initially defined may not be flexible enough to respond to these changes 
without a good amount of revision and redefinition.  
Further, and compounding the problem, there are no widely applicable processes for 
rapidly revising acquisition strategy for changed business goals, nor are there widely used 
processes to accommodate changes to architecture as a result of such changed goals. 
Observed Response to the Problem. When such changes as those described 
previously occur, program personnel are often unsure about whether the architecture, 
acquisition strategy, or both can accommodate the needed changes and, even if they can, 
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whether the changes can be accomplished, given the time and effort that will be required 
(e.g., to get all necessary approvals for a revised acquisition strategy). Hence, programs 
tend to continue executing as though there has been minimal change to the initial goals and 
priorities; there is little impetus to revise the acquisition strategy or make anything more than 
minimal alterations to the architecture. In effect, the program is operating with either an 
implicit change in acquisition strategy or a mismatch between the architecture defined 
initially and the changed mission goals, or both.  
Consequences. In one of the programs we studied, this anti-pattern had a 
considerable negative effect. The program initially had a very successful architecture and 
acquisition strategy; the program was so successful that its scope grew from delivering 
capability for one system to delivering capability to multiple systems of a similar type. The 
architecture and acquisition strategy survived this change in scope initially, but as the 
separate systems matured, and as need arose for them to interoperate, unexpected 
demands were placed on the architecture. An additional factor was that the stakeholders 
became increasingly interested in system reliability—a new quality attribute for this program. 
At this point, both the architecture and the acquisition strategy failed. This program has 
entered a strategic pause while the architecture and the acquisition strategy are 
reconsidered in light of both the new requirement (reliability) and the increased complexity of 
what is now a SoS. 
In general, this anti-pattern reflects a natural tendency to stay the course, even when 
circumstances change and external conditions evolve.  
Turbulent Acquisition Environment 
Context. This anti-pattern is closely related to anti-pattern #3 (Failure to Adapt). But 
in this case, the cause is not extended program evolution but rather severe instability in 
multiple program elements. This instability is manifest by changes in goals, strategy, or 
architecture that are so frequent and contradictory, they require adaptation that, even under 
the best circumstances, the program is unable to accommodate. These changes can be 
political, strategic, technological, or fiscal.  
Problem. Several causes can bring about program turbulence. Budgets can undergo 
major revisions, and major portions of a program’s funding can be withdrawn. Mission 
circumstances can be suddenly changed, or radically new technologies can be 
disseminated rapidly. Programs, particularly if they are perceived to be in severe difficulty, 
can face significant revisions of goals and purpose. Joint programs often undergo periodic 
management shifts when different services assume primary responsibility. 
In cases where one or more of the previously mentioned conditions are present, a 
program can find itself faced with the demand for change that is impossible to 
accommodate. The magnitude of the requested change is often unrealistic, impractical, or 
impossible, given time and resource realities. 
As the program personnel attempt to adapt to the changes, the original architecture 
and acquisition strategy may now be highly unsuited to the changed conditions that have 
been levied on the program. The program falls into a mode of “architecture of the day” or 
“acquisition strategy of the day.” Equally problematic and an important part of the problem is 
that the program is usually still contractually held to some part of the original acquisition 
strategy. 
Observed Response to the Problem. The frequent and significant changes in 
mission or business goals overpower the ability of the acquisition strategy or architecture (or 
both) to accommodate them. Thus, the original acquisition strategy is implicitly abandoned 
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but without having a well-defined new strategy created. Or the architecture is stretched to 
the breaking point and loses all relation to the original acquisition strategy. 
Yet many programs attempt to continue executing with, at most, minimal explicit 
revision of the acquisition strategy and/or architecture. The necessary task to revise the 
acquisition strategy to fully account for the changed goals is seldom performed, nor is the 
work needed to revise the original architecture carried out as carefully as is required.  
Consequences. This anti-pattern was observed in three of the six programs under 
study. In one of them, significant changes to mission, architecture, hardware, and program 
direction each occurred, some repeatedly. For instance, the program began with a strong 
research basis but very quickly was given mandates to field equipment as quickly as 
possible. Different quality attributes were given different priorities as the architecture evolved 
through several iterations of development. Different contractors were given conflicting 
priorities throughout program execution. The result was that the program fielded a small 
fraction of what was originally planned, after which the program was cancelled.  
There is little doubt that the environment of DoD acquisition always has some 
instability; that is the natural condition of government programs. But in the final analysis, 
when the environment is truly turbulent (i.e., when this anti-pattern is strongly present), the 
best result is likely to be systems that are poorly fitted to the purposes for which they are to 
be used. In the worst case, they may even be unfit for use at all. 
Poor Consideration of Software 
Context. This anti-pattern occurs when critical decisions are made, especially early 
in a program, that have strong negative implications on the system’s software. There is a 
historical basis for this behavior: For decades, the DoD acquired systems that were primarily 
hardware. But while the role and importance of software has grown significantly in recent 
years, the traditions and habits of acquisition still reflect the earlier, hardware-centric 
posture. 
Problem. Very often, software is not deemed a critical factor in decisions made at 
the earliest stages of a program. These decisions generally are made with little or no 
understanding of how software must be accounted for in the acquisition strategy or the 
architecture (or both).  
One symptom: Contracts are organized based primarily on the system architecture 
and fail to take into consideration the very sizable role of software. Assumptions are made 
about the expected integration of software entities that are created separately; such 
assumptions are often made with no understanding of the difficulties that arise when 
complex independent software systems must interoperate or be integrated. This leads to 
system architectures and acquisition strategies that over-constrain the yet-to-be-defined 
software architecture, thus adding significant complexity to software development and 
integration. Even in a software-only system, the real difficulties that the software can pose 
(e.g., integration of many heterogeneous components) are largely ignored.  
One other such symptom is that quality attributes that are important to the system 
engineering community may be quite different from those that are significant to the software 
community. Even if the two communities speak of a single quality attribute (e.g., reliability), 
they refer to different things. Thus, early decisions about quality attributes typically are 
decisions about system, not software, quality attributes. 
Observed Response to the Problem. As a result, the acquisition strategy either is 
created with a strong focus on system architecture or, in software-only systems, fails to 
address the software architecture satisfactorily. In the former case, this inevitably produces 
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a large gap between the system and software architectures; in the latter case, the planned 
software acquisition strategy is unrealistic and impractical.  
A common “solution” is that the software architect tries to play “catch up” and fit the 
software to the system architecture. Another “solution” is to ignore the eventual complexities 
of integration and expect that they can be resolved later. In these cases, the result is often 
that the system constraints force software choices that are suboptimal for the whole system.  
Consequence. This anti-pattern was observed in three programs. In one program, 
two critical early decisions about software were made with very little understanding of 
software’s inherent complexity. The system was large and complex, with three major 
software components. An early decision concerning the integration of those three 
components downplayed all of the details of that integration: who would do it, what 
resources it would need, and how difficult it would be. No attempt was made to base this 
decision on expert software advice, nor on data readily available from comparable programs 
about the difficulty of such a task. Another decision related to the assumption that the 
system could later be made to interoperate with another complex software system. But no 
rigorous assessment was made of the difficulty of accomplishing that interoperation nor of 
the resources that this integration would require. In both cases, the assumptions proved 
false, and the program was cancelled. 
In general, in the presence of this anti-pattern, there will be major software 
requirements that cannot be satisfied. In a system with both hardware and software 
elements, this is often a direct result of a software architecture that had to be made to fit 
poorly into a system architecture that was already defined. Further, the problems and delays 
that result from the gap between the system and the software architectures are typically 
blamed on the software components alone. In the worst cases, these suboptimal decisions 
are reflected in system-level schedule delays and cost overruns. 
Inappropriate Acquisition Strategies  
Context. The time factor figures prominently in DoD acquisitions. Starting from the 
earliest moments of a program (i.e., the awareness of a need for a new or updated system), 
one urgent, yet often unstated, imperative is to move quickly to avoid any eventualities that 
might delay, or even prevent, a program from achieving its desired milestones. This 
imperative is often exacerbated by the need to spend an amount of money that was 
established as many as two years previously, at a point where little was actually known 
about the realities that the program would face. It is further exacerbated by the lengthy 
review process before a new contract can be awarded. These realities of the time factor 
have led to acquisition strategies that are often poorly suited to an individual program’s 
needs. 
Problem. There are multiple causes of this anti-pattern. Program offices might 
 wish to avoid protests 
 get quick approval for a program (e.g., before anticipated budget cuts) 
 lack sufficient acquisition expertise to develop  an acquisition strategy that will 
quickly gain approval 
 have a particular acquisition strategy imposed by a higher authority 
In another scenario, some key business goals (e.g., split an acquisition that is 
conceptually a single system into multiple acquisitions to avoid a “big bang”) are in direct 
conflict with the technology to be used, the system to be built, or both.  
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Note that these causes can be either external (protests, budget cuts) or internal 
(inexperience of a program management office to develop and defend a solid acquisition 
strategy).  
Observed Response to the Problem. Whatever the particular cause, the result is 
that the primary goal of the program office and the source selection team is to get through a 
competition and issue a contract as quickly as possible. And even though the chosen 
acquisition strategy might have a poor fit, or even a misfit, with the business and/or mission 
goals for the system, the inappropriate acquisition strategy is put in place. The program 
begins execution, deferring or ignoring the parts of the strategy that have a poor fit with the 
real needs of the system to be built and, too often, the wrong contract relationship with the 
software developer(s).  
Consequences. This anti-pattern was observed in five of the six programs under 
study. In one program, the fear of a “big bang” approach led to splitting the intended large 
system into two separate acquisitions, with the assumption that the two systems could later 
be integrated into a large SoS. But the second program suffered a very long and complex 
protest and did not get underway until several years after the first had begun. By that time, 
the first had completed most of its requirements and was nearing initial operational 
deployment. But there had been no input from the stakeholders of the second system about 
the interfaces that would be needed to make eventual integration of the two systems 
feasible. Thus, the plan for integrating the two systems was abandoned, and the second 
program was eventually cancelled. The first program fielded a system that provided only a 
small portion of the expected functionality. 
In general, in the presence of this anti-pattern, one of two immediate consequences 
will emerge. Either the acquisition strategy is ignored as the program unfolds or the program 
is forced to bend the needs of the system to the inappropriate strategy. In the latter case, 
the system can reach a point where it can no longer meet its mission goals, business goals, 
or both.  
Overlooking Quality Attributes 
Context. In the earliest stages of a program’s life, there may be no formal program 
office and only minimal accompanying funding to perform necessary work. Further, there is 
significant pressure to rapidly produce the acquisition strategy and initial architecture in 
order for the program to be funded. But there is no requirement to use quality attributes to 
define that architecture, and little incentive to do so. Further, in many cases, the detailed 
business goals are unwritten (see anti-pattern #1) or the importance of the software is 
ignored (see anti-pattern #5), and hence, there is little opportunity to expose the quality 
attributes that the system is expected to manifest. 
Problem. The program overlooks the software quality attributes that should support 
the goals, whether mission or business. Instead, programs rely on key performance 
parameters (KPPs), which are not broken down in sufficient detail that architects can reason 
about the necessary alignment among the software architecture, system architecture, 
acquisition strategy, and aggregate set of goals for the system. 
Observed Response. In order to meet the reporting needs and get to a “go” or “no 
go” decision for a system, programs put their engineering resources into eliciting and 
capturing the functional capabilities and requirements and provide only minimal attention to 
quality attributes by focusing on a limited set (e.g., performance, availability). Worse, the 
notions of those quality attributes are more often those understood by system engineers 
rather than software engineers.  
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As a result, architectural decisions that should be based on extensive consideration 
of all quality attributes—software as well as systems—are made by “gut feel,” or by adopting 
an architecture from a similar or idealized system, rather than by reasoning that placed real 
importance on the specific software quality attributes for the system at hand. 
Consequences. This anti-pattern was observed in four of the programs under study. 
In one joint program, the system was to be integrated into operations in each of the military 
Services. However, the concept of operations for each of the Services was different (i.e., 
where the system would be hosted, security needs, what other systems would be 
integrated), and these differences, all of which implied different quality attributes, were not 
recognized early in the program. Neither the acquisition strategy nor the architecture 
accommodated these differences. The quality attribute descriptions that were constructed 
reflected the needs of only one of the Services and focused only on technical issues; they 
explicitly ignored that same Service’s business goals. It eventually became apparent that the 
program office and the end users had very different approaches to meeting even the single 
Service’s stated needs. 
In general, the primary consequence of this anti-pattern is that the resultant system 
architecture (and the likely inefficient software architecture) will satisfy only some of the 
goals; others will be, at best, partially satisfied and often unsatisfied.  In the longer term, 
since sufficient knowledge of the quality attributes is lacking, the program will not have the 
strong analytic base needed to fully understand the impacts of different modes of evolution 
that might be needed over the system’s life cycle.  
Countering the Patterns 
The anti-patterns described in the preceding section provide evidence of undesirable 
behaviors that are repeated across multiple programs. We believe that these undesirable 
behaviors are not intentional but indicate flaws in the existing approach to the acquisition of 
software-reliant systems. We also believe that at least part of the solution to this problem 
lies in analyzing how these anti-patterns operate at both the micro level and the macro level. 
In the previous section, we examined the individual consequences of each anti-pattern. In 
this section, we consider how, in combination, they jointly can affect the major entities that 
participate in the acquisition process.  
Necessary Entities and Artifacts 
The anti-patterns we observed relate to a small number of distinct entities, each of 
which has major importance for a program and the system it is building. For instance, one 
anti-pattern focused on how programs ignored the impact of quality attributes. There is 
ample evidence and experience, such as that discussed by Gagliardi, Wood, Morrow, and 
Klein (2010), showing that the main drivers for software architecture should be the quality 
attributes that the system must exhibit. These quality attributes are derived from another key 
entity, the mission needs expressed by stakeholders.  
Another anti-pattern dealt with business goals that were either only expressed 
generally or only implicitly understood. The business goals for a program are an additional 
key entity. But these are likely the goals of a very different set of stakeholders. Although not 
commonly understood, the business goals, like the mission goals, will have quality attributes 
that should be the main drivers for the acquisition strategy; we assert that these other quality 
attributes are as important as those derived from the mission goals. We will refer to these 
other quality attributes as acquisition quality attributes. 
Given these two sets of goals, which in turn are the principal drivers for two very 
critical entities (i.e., the acquisition strategy and the software and system architectures), the 
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potential for conflicts between those goals is large, as is shown in the anti-pattern of 
conflicting goals.  
Finally, the notion of “the stakeholders” embodies a complex and diverse collection 
of individuals and organizations; they are the sources for the goals and the recipients of the 
benefits of the system to be created. 
We posit several key entities of interest: 
 mission goals 
 the (mission) quality attributes implicit in those goals  
 business goals 
 the (acquisition) quality attributes implicit in those goals  
 the acquisition strategy 
 the software and system architectures, which are closely related, but 
separate 
 the different sets of stakeholders who have expressed needs that are 
captured by the mission and business goals 
While these entities represent a diverse set of things, including humans 
(stakeholders) and intangibles (goals), we posit that all of these entities must, at least in 
some manner, be manifest in physical artifacts. Some such artifacts are immediately 
obvious: the mission goals will ultimately be reflected in a requirements specification; an 
acquisition strategy document is mandatory for any program. Other artifacts are less well 
defined and may not even be present in a given program. We assert that they are just as 
necessary. 
The stakeholders for a given acquisition, for instance, cannot be a vague collection 
of unknown persons but must be defined with at least minimal specificity: “the HR personnel 
who do data entry for the Air Force Logistics Command,” “the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for XYZ,” and so forth. The definition of the stakeholders may not have a formal 
document type associated with it, but it must be physical: There must be some way to 
determine who precisely has one or another goal, if only to assist in determining priorities 
and negotiating conflicts. Similarly, the business goals themselves may first be only general 
expressions found in a statement of need. But eventually those must find some form of 
detailed notation in a physical document that is a real analog to a requirements 
specification. Thus, we assert that each of the entities listed previously has an associated 
artifact, which we can inspect, reason about, and compare with other artifacts of the 
acquisition process. 
Necessary Relationships 
These entities are related to each other by means of several different relationships. 
For each, we use the formula “Entity X <relationship> Entity Y.”   The following are the 
pertinent relationships identified in our analysis: 
 <have> 
 <are embodied by> 
 <are consistent with> 
 <drive> 
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We show these entities and relationships in Figure 1. Some relationships are 
unidirectional, and the arrow indicates which entity is the actor (e.g., for “X <drive> Y,” the 
direction of the arrow is from X to Y). Some of these relationships are reflexive (e.g., “X 
<informs> Y” and “Y <informs> X”). In these cases, the arrow is two-headed.  
 
 Key Entities and Relationships Identified During Our Analysis 
When we consider these entities and relationships in light of the anti-patterns, we 
see the following: 
The <have> relationships concern anti-patterns #1 and #4. While stakeholders 
have business goals, these goals are often not expressed; the problem is exacerbated by 
the lack of a process for recording business goals. If these goals can be captured so that the 
collection of business goals, stemming from all stakeholders, exists in a coherent document, 
then anti-pattern #1 cannot occur; the business goals will have been documented. If a 
program office captures and records these goals, then the office can reason about changes 
in the acquisition environment. It can determine whether the inevitable changes can be 
accommodated within the program’s current scope or whether a reset of the acquisition 
strategy or the architectures or both will be required. If a program office can perform such 
reasoning then, although turbulence in the acquisition environment cannot be prevented, the 
program office can have an appropriate response to the turbulence and prevent the 
occurrence of anti-pattern #4. 
The <are embodied by> relationships concern anti-pattern #7. If the business 
and mission goals are analyzed and re-expressed in terms of acquisition quality attributes 
and software/system quality attributes, respectively, then anti-pattern #7 cannot occur since 
the quality attributes will have been carefully analyzed as part of program creation.  
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The <are consistent with> relationship concerns anti-pattern #2. Assuming that 
all of the relevant quality attributes (software, system, and acquisition) have been clearly 
expressed, it will be possible to reason about all quality attributes, comparing and 
performing tradeoffs between the types of attributes. If the quality attributes are consistent 
with each other, then conflicts among the goals will have been resolved and anti-pattern #2 
will not occur. 
The <drive> relationships concern anti-patterns #5 and #6. Years of research 
and practical usage of quality attributes have demonstrated that they should be the primary 
influences on both software and system architectures (Bass, Clements, & Kazman, 2012). In 
the situations where the quality attributes are used to create the architectures, then we can 
be certain that those qualities important to the program have been considered and the 
resultant architecture is consistent with the quality attributes. In such a case, anti-pattern #5 
cannot occur. Similarly, if the acqusition strategy is derived from the quality attributes that 
have been developed from the business goals, then it is likely that the strategy will indeed 
reflect all of the stakeholder expectations and cannot be considered to be inappropriate to 
the institutional goals of the organizations involved, thus preventing the occurrence of anti-
pattern #6. 
The <constrains> relationship concerns anti-pattern #3. Even when the 
acquisition strategy and the software architecture are specifically aligned, this alignment 
must be maintained through the life of the system and/or the life of the program office. As 
the system matures, new goals emerge that must be accommodated in the acquisition 
strategy or the architecture or both. Ensuring that the architectures continue to constrain the 
acquisition strategy and the acquisition strategy continues to constrain the architectures will 
increase the likelihood that the program is feasible. In such a way, anti-pattern #3 can be 
prevented from occurring. 
The <informs> relationship does not specifically concern an observed anti-
pattern. Nonetheless, considerable research has shown the importance of mutual influence 
between software and system architecture. Maier (1998) succinctly described the different 
perspectives and the impact of not explicitly balancing the engineering and managing 
between these two architectures. We therefore include it here for completeness. 
Figure 2 summarizes the anti-patterns as they affect the entities and relationships. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= - 74 - 
=
 
 Anti-Patterns That Affect Specific Relationships and Entities 
Acquisition Quality Attributes 
A key aspect in our work is the notion of acquisition quality attributes. This 
represents a new concept and is the focus of our current investigations. We have introduced 
them because we are motivated by the considerable body of work on software quality 
attributes and expect that the acquisition quality attributes are as important to acquisition 
strategy as software quality attributes are to the software architecture. Because we see such 
a close analogy between these two types of quality attributes, we believe that research into 
these attributes can be modeled on the research into software quality attributes. 
Role of Acquisition Quality Attributes 
Acquisition quality attributes are derived from the business goals and exert their 
strongest influence on the acquisition strategy. They relate the business goals to the 
acquisition strategy in the same way that the software quality attributes relate the mission 
goals to the software architecture. To formulate acquisition quality attributes for a program 
implies the following step of explicitly developing an acquisition strategy that accommodates 
them: They must be designed into the strategy to minimize the risk of failure. Note that 
incorporating these qualities into the acquisition strategy is no guarantee that the program 
will be successful, but it lays the foundation upon which success can be built. 
As with software quality attributes, acquisition quality attributes will be dependent on 
the specific circumstances of the program in question. For example, a program may have 
little concern for long-term sustainability if there is little expectation that the deployed system 
will be sustained over the long term; hence, the acquisition strategy should be concerned 
about many quality attributes but not about sustainability. (This can occur in situations where 
there is an imperative need to get something deployed as rapidly as possible.). Or a 
program may be developed as a research prototype with no concern about deployability or 
sustainability if the major goal is to prove a concept, not field a capability. The key point is 
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that these attributes must be understood in the context of each particular program so that a 
suitable acquisition strategy can be developed. 
As with software quality attributes, we expect that some acquisition quality attributes 
will be universal. Thus, every program is started with some sense of producing a good 
result, and we would expect every program to have some sense of “achievability,” although 
precisely what that means would differ from program to program. Similarly, programs with 
the goals for a long lifetime will exhibit sustainability and evolvability; if not, the programs are 
unlikely to enjoy their long life spans without major, costly adjustments over their lifetimes. 
Giving Meaning to Acquisition Quality Attributes 
As stated previously, our view of acquisition quality attributes is that they are an 
analog to software quality attributes, although the qualities they relate to may differ. And like 
software quality attributes, they have little inherent meaning that is not ambiguous and must 
be given precise meaning by some other mechanism. 
One approach would be to try to develop precise definitions of each acquisition 
quality attribute. Our experience, however, is that this would lead to the same difficulties 
found with software or system quality attributes, where many different and inconsistent 
quality models exist and the definitions are either too general or too contradictory to be of 
use. (For instance, one could conjecture many definitions of sustainability, but which 
definition was appropriate to a specific program and system would still need to be resolved.) 
Instead, we follow the approach used in software architecture (and later, system 
architecture) of developing scenarios, which have the purpose of defining precisely the 
meaning of the attributes in the context of a specific acquisition. Such an approach 
eliminates needless discussion about the “correct” definition of any individual attribute and, 
more importantly, gives meanings based on the context of a particular acquisition. 
The software architecture work at the SEI was of great benefit in representing quality 
attribute scenarios in six parts: source, stimulus, artifact, environment, response, and 
response measure (Barbacci et al., 2003). Following this approach, we characterize the 
parts of an acquisition quality attribute in the same manner: 
 Source: The person, group, or organization that generates the stimulus. 
 Stimulus: A condition or event that needs to be considered when it occurs 
during the acquisition. 
 Environment: The conditions under which the stimulus occurs.  
 Artifact: The artifact that is stimulated. 
 Response: The activity undertaken after the arrival of the stimulus. 
 Response measure: When the response occurs, ideally this will be 
measurable in some fashion so that the scenario is testable. 
As an example, in one program, an acquisition quality attribute scenario for 
“flexibility” could be described by this scenario: “In an environment where the continuing 
resolution bans new program starts, warfighters in the field demand new capability now. The 
new capability is added to an existing development contract without change in scope.” The 
scenario elements would then correspond to 
Source: Warfighters in the field 
Stimulus: … demand a new capability now. 
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Environment: The continuing resolution bans new program starts 
Artifact: … and so an existing development contract 
Response: … is modified to add the desired capability 
Response measure: … without change in scope 
Yet in another program, the same quality attribute of “flexibility” could yield a 
somewhat different scenario due to the differences between the programs. For example, this 
other scenario might be: “In an environment where the deployment strategy has not yet 
been defined, warfighters in the field demand new capability now. The existing development 
contract is modified to provide an early delivery of the desired capability.” Here, the scenario 
elements are 
Source: Warfighters in the field 
Stimulus: … demand a new capability now 
Environment: The deployment strategy has not yet been fully defined 
Artifact: … so the development contract 
Response: … is modified to provide the desired capability 
Response measure: … to support an early delivery 
In both of these cases, the scenarios provide specific meanings for “flexibility” but 
also indicate how they would imply different acquisition strategies for the two situations. 
Working With Acquisition Quality Attribute Scenarios 
We expect that the notion of acquisition quality attributes has the same relevance to 
the acquisition professional that software quality attributes have to the software architect. 
Thus, in practice, we would hope that a valuable exercise for an acquisition team early in a 
program’s life would be to consider the program they are defining in terms of the acquisition 
quality attributes implied by the program’s business goals (whether explicitly stated or 
otherwise). In such an exercise, we start with the business goals and, for each one, elicit 
one or more acquisition quality attributes. These are then used to elicit detailed scenarios 
that would give precise meaning to the quality attributes. One of the most effective 
mechanisms for eliciting scenarios is through guided brainstorming where appropriate 
stakeholders volunteer scenarios that are subsequently reviewed for their importance. One 
key issue is to explicitly consider the difficulty of satisfying the scenarios. Scenarios that are 
both of high importance and difficult to satisfy are the ones that will receive the most 
attention during the subsequent analysis. 
Again, working as a group, the scenarios must then be analyzed for consistency with 
each other. If the consensus is that some scenarios are inconsistent with others, this implies 
that some business goals are inconsistent with each other and that the program cannot 
satisfy all of those goals. Ideally, conflicting business goals will be negotiated by the 
stakeholders until they no longer conflict, thus leading to an acquisition approach that can 
satisfy the stated goals.  
Because acquisition quality scenarios define how the program must respond to 
events, the scenarios can now be used to determine whether a proposed acquisition 
strategy will allow the program to respond appropriately to expected future events. The 
collection of scenarios can be used to shape the program’s acquisition strategy so that it will 
embody the negotiated goals for the program.  
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Finally, we expect that both the elicitation and analysis of acquisition quality 
attributes, and their associated scenarios, can be combined with the elicitation and analysis 
of software quality attributes. In such a case, the consistency analysis can account for both 
software and acquisition quality attributes, thereby leading to a negotiation between mission 
and business goals. Although harmony between the two sets of scenarios does not 
guarantee program success, we posit that if there are conflicts between the software-based 
and acquisition-based scenarios, it is extremely likely that the architecture will conflict with 
the acquisition strategy and be a significant detractor to program success. 
We are currently in the process of validating our assertion that acquisition quality 
attributes can be used to define the relationship between business goals and acquisition 
strategies. We are performing this validation by reviewing various programs, extracting their 
business goals, developing plausible scenarios, and then defining pieces of the acquisition 
strategy that would satisfy the scenario. 
In addition, we are examining several cases of long-lived programs where we can 
clearly distinguish between the original goals for the program and changes to those goals. 
Through interviews, we extracted the business goals and the associated acquisition strategy 
that the programs adopted, developing acquisition quality attribute scenarios as examples. 
As new goals were added, we developed new acquisition quality attributes. Our goal with 
this exercise was not to second-guess or judge the original acquisition strategy but, rather, 
to show that scenarios can be found to be consistent or in conflict and that the new scenario 
can be used to judge the effectiveness of the existing acquisition strategy. 
 Conclusions and Next Steps  
Alignment between the architecture and acquisition strategy does not occur naturally. 
Our research has revealed seven behavioral patterns, or anti-patterns, that lead to 
misalignments, which have contributed to program restarts, cancellations, and other failures. 
We have also learned that the effect of these anti-patterns can most easily be 
observed through several key entities, and the relationships that should hold between and 
among them. A key insight derived from this research is that the relationship of the 
acquisition strategy to the business goals is analogous to the relationship between the 
software architecture and the mission goals. Our continuing investigations include 
developing acquisition quality attributes with associated six-part scenarios and validating 
that they can be used to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate acquisition 
strategies. 
Our future goal is to create an alignment method that assists program office 
personnel to systematically identify probable areas of mismatch between business and 
mission goals, acquisition strategy, and software architecture. With such a method, two 
outcomes would be feasible: (1) program managers can build acquisition strategies that 
more systematically eliminate one key cause of program failure, and (2) acquisition 
overseers can better evaluate the adequacy of the acquisition strategy as programs move to 
different life cycle phases. While this alone will not guarantee program success, we believe 
that it could be a significant factor in avoiding failures. 
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